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REPRESENTING VETERANS 
Jennifer D. Oliva* 
ABSTRACT 
Federal law has long deprived American veterans of certain fundamental legal rights 
enjoyed by non-veterans and attributable to veteran sacrifice. Federal case law, for example, 
denies veterans the right to bring an action in tort against the federal government to 
vindicate in-service injuries. And the United States Code deprives veterans of their right to 
robust judicial oversight of Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) service-connected benefit 
decisions. This pair of due process deprivations is compounded by the federal statute that 
prohibits veterans from exercising the fundamental right to counsel during the initial stage 
of the VA claims process. This Article examines the federal statutory scheme and pertinent 
case law that has long denied veterans the right to counsel throughout the VA veteran 
claims adjudication process, debunks the rationales underlying that law, and concludes by 
recommending that the federal government extend to veterans the right to counsel 
throughout the VA’s benefits adjudication proceedings. 
“What an irony that the veterans who have fought to see that we all have 
these legal rights, are the very ones who are being denied those rights now.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It is important to concede up front that the task at hand—the diagnosis and 
treatment of the singular most formidable legal challenge currently faced by 
American veterans—is beyond the capacity of this Article. The litany of ways in 
which federal law deprives our former service members of fundamental legal rights 
enjoyed by non-veterans and attributable to veteran sacrifice makes it impossible 
to reasonably choose just one culprit. More frustrating, the purportedly “pro-
veteran” American public appears either unaware of—or unconcerned about—the 
law’s anomalous treatment of veterans insofar as basic due process rights are 
concerned. As United States Marine Corps veteran and law professor Andrew 
 
 * Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law; J.D., Georgetown 
University; M.B.A., University of Oxford; B.S., United States Military Academy. This Article is 
dedicated to the brave Americans who have selflessly served our nation in the United States Armed 
Forces. 
 1. S. 11, The Proposed Veterans’ Administration Adjudication Procedure and Judicial Review Act, and 
S. 2292, Veterans’ Judicial Review Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 100th Cong. 47 
(1988) (statement of Sen. Thomas A. Daschle). 
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Popper has explained, “Service members are routinely called heroes—and they are. 
It is the highest public calling. Yet these gestures seem, at best, incomplete when 
accompanied by a deprivation of . . . the basic rights due to all citizens.”2 
Federal case law, for example, has stripped veterans of the right to bring a cause 
of action in tort against the federal government to vindicate injuries incurred in 
service. Title 38 of the United States Code also denies veterans the right to robust 
judicial oversight of Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) decisions denying them 
their hard-earned, service-connected benefit entitlements. These unjustified, 
veteran-centric due process deprivations are compounded by the federal statute 
that prohibits veterans from exercising the fundamental right to counsel during 
the initial stage of the VA claims process. This Article, therefore, argues that the 
federal statutory scheme and pertinent case law that have long denied veterans the 
right to counsel throughout the VA’s veterans’ claims adjudication process are 
ripe for reform. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II explains the federal doctrine that 
denies veterans the right to bring a private cause of action to remedy in-service 
injuries caused by the federal government’s tortious conduct. Part III details the 
genesis of the federal law that denied veterans the right to judicial oversight of 
VA’s service-connected claims decisions until recently and examines the ongoing 
inadequacy of the current veteran judicial review scheme. Part IV provides an 
overview of both the legacy and newly enacted veterans’ service-connected 
disability claims processes. It then explores the historic—and bogus—rationales 
underlying the nation’s long-standing refusal to extend the right to counsel to 
veterans during VA claims adjudication proceedings. Part V concludes this Article 
by recommending that federal law be reformed to extend the right to obtain legal 
representation to veterans during the initial stage of the VA claims process and 
offering myriad arguments in favor of that proposal. 
II.  THE RIGHT TO BRING A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION 
Unlike their civilian counterparts, service members and veterans are deprived 
of the basic right to bring civil lawsuits against the government to vindicate 
particular injuries. The plain language of the 1946 Federal Torts Claims Act 
(FTCA) extended to all persons the right to bring civil suits against the federal 
government for injuries inflicted by the sovereign’s negligent and intentional 
tortious conduct, including rape, sexual assault, battery, medical malpractice, 
torture, and murder.3 Four years after the FTCA was enacted, however, the 
Supreme Court held in Feres v. United States that the federal government was 
immune from suit brought by current and former members of the armed forces 
who had incurred injuries “incident to [military] service” because, among other 
things, such suits would adversely affect military order and discipline.4 
 
 2. Andrew Popper, Rethinking Feres: Granting Access to Justice for Service Members, 60 B.C. L. 
REV. 1491, 1498 (2019) (footnote omitted). 
 3. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 1402(b), 2401(b), 2402, 2671–2680 (2018) (originally enacted as 
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, tit. IV, 60 Stat. 812, 842–47 (amended 
2006)). 
 4. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950). 
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As one veteran commentator has noted, “The force of [Feres] was apparent 
immediately: most [service members] injured incident to military service would be 
denied access to the very system of justice they pledged to defend.”5 The Feres 
doctrine’s seven-decade reign of injustice has well-fulfilled that prediction. 
Imagine a scenario in which a group of civilians and service members developed 
life-threatening diseases due to their exposure to harmful toxins emitting from a 
military installation proximate to their respective residences. Under current law, 
the affected civilians would be entitled to initiate an FTCA action against the 
Department of Defense to recover for their injuries, but similarly situated service 
members would be entirely precluded from bringing suit. Worse yet, the lower 
federal courts have applied the Feres doctrine to bar current and former service 
members who have been raped or otherwise viciously assaulted in service from the 
right to sue to vindicate their injuries.6 Certain circuits have even held that service 
members and veterans are precluded from pursing a cause of action to vindicate 
diseases contracted by their in utero infants, which are causally connected to a 
service member parent’s exposure to health-harming toxins—including radiation—
while in service.7 
“Both academics and [the] lower [federal] courts have condemned the [Feres] 
doctrine as unfounded, unfair, and even un-American.”8 Moreover, the doctrine’s 
unmooring from the plain language of the FTCA has provoked the ire of 
prominent Supreme Court textualists. Justice Scalia, for example, has argued that 
the plain language of the FTCA not only undermines Feres, it mandates the 
opposite result insofar as it indicates that 
Congress thought . . . barring recovery [for service members] might adversely 
affect military discipline. After all, the morale of Lieutenant Commander 
Johnson’s comrades-in-arms will not likely be boosted by news that his widow 
and children will receive only a fraction of the amount they might have 
recovered had he been piloting a commercial helicopter at the time of his 
death.9 
Notwithstanding these persuasive critiques, Feres remains the law of the land and 
continues to force veterans to seek the substandard remedies offered by the 
dysfunctional VA service-connected disability benefits system, which is discussed 
in greater detail below. 
 
 5. Popper, supra note 2, at 1495. 
 6. See, e.g., Klay v. Panetta, 924 F. Supp. 2d 8, 13 (D.D.C. 2013) (barring the tort claim of a 
former service member who suffered an in-service sexual assault pursuant to Feres), aff’d, 758 F.3d 
369 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 7. See, e.g., Mondelli v. United States, 711 F.2d 567, 568 (3d Cir. 1983) (barring a suit under 
Feres brought on behalf of an infant whose “genetic injuries [were] caused by her father’s exposure to 
radiation while he was on active duty in the United States Army” while “acknowledg[ing] the result 
to be a harsh one”). 
 8. Jonathan Turley, Pax Militaris: The Feres Doctrine and the Retention of Sovereign Immunity in 
the Military System of Governance, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 2 (2003). 
 9. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 700 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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III.  THE RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW 
“[T]here has been significant dissatisfaction with the exercise of judicial 
review functions [governing veterans’ claims].”10 
The United States also has an extensive history of depriving veterans of the 
basic due process right to judicial review. Congress denied former service 
members any independent judicial oversight of VA claims decisions until 1988, 
when it enacted the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act (VJRA) and, thereby, created 
the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC).11 Prior to the 
establishment of the CAVC, veterans were proscribed from challenging VA claims 
denial decisions—regardless of their illegality—because those agency 
determinations were final and unreviewable.12 
VA staunchly opposed judicial oversight of the agency’s benefits decisions.13 
“VA’s most frequently voiced concern was that [such review] would impair its 
long-standing, supportive, non[-]adversarial role in its relationship with 
veterans.”14 As provided in the next section, VA has repeatedly invoked the highly 
debatable and self-serving argument that veterans must be deprived of basic due 
process rights, including the right to judicial oversight of VA claims decisions and 
attorney representation, in order to preserve the agency’s purportedly 
paternalistic, pro-veteran, and non-adversarial benefits adjudication system. VA 
also advanced several other reasons in support of its opposition to judicial 
oversight, including the contention that such review would increase agency costs 
and incentivize opportunistic attorneys to swindle veterans out of their well-
deserved benefits.15 
It was no secret in Congress that VA’s long-standing immunity from judicial 
review was aberrant in the federal system. A 1988 U.S. House of Representatives 
Report expressly acknowledged that “the Veterans’ Administration stands in 
‘splendid isolation as the single federal administrative agency whose major 
functions are explicitly insulated from judicial review.’”16 Unsurprisingly, and as 
 
 10. Richard E. Levy, Of Two Minds: Charitable and Social Insurance Models in the Veterans Benefits 
System, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 303, 321 (2004). 
 11. Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, tit. III, 102 Stat. 4105, 4113–22 (1988) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C. (2018)). 
 12. Veterans’ Benefits Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-56, § 211(a), 71 Stat. 83, 92 (“[D]ecisions of 
the Administrator on any question of law or fact concerning a claim for benefits or payments under 
any law administered by the Veterans Administration shall be final and conclusive and no other 
official or any court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any such 
decision.”). 
 13. See, e.g., Hugh B. McClean, Delay, Deny, Wait Till They Die: Balancing Veterans’ Rights and 
Non-Adversarial Procedures in the VA Disability Benefits System, 72 SMU L. REV. 277, 288 (2019) 
(explaining that “the VA vehemently opposed judicial oversight and, as one scholar put it, . . . was 
brought ‘kicking and screaming’ into the realm of due process”); Levy, supra note 10, at 320. 
 14. Charles L. Cragin, The Impact of Judicial Review on the Department of Veterans Affairs’ Claims 
Adjudication Process: The Changing Role of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, 46 ME. L. REV. 23, 26–27 
(1994). 
 15. Stacey-Rae Simcox, Thirty Years After Walters the Mission Is Clear, the Execution Is Muddled: A 
Fresh Look at the Supreme Court’s Decision to Deny Veterans the Due Process Right to Hire Attorneys in the 
VA Benefits Process, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 689–90 (2016). 
 16. H.R. REP. 100-963, at 10 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5782, 5791 (quoting 
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Professor Michael Wishnie has wisely pointed out, such legal isolation operated 
over time to undermine the civil rights and legal interests of veterans17 while 
protecting VA from public scrutiny and potential reform. 
There is little doubt that subjecting VA claims decisions to judicial review was 
a welcome improvement for veterans. In theory at least, Congress enacted such 
oversight to ensure that VA follows its own rules throughout its administrative 
benefits proceedings. The court that Congress created to adjudicate veteran 
claims, however, is an Article I court of limited jurisdiction. As such, the CAVC’s 
scope of review and peculiar procedures depart in critical ways from that of the 
regional Article III appellate courts of general jurisdiction—frequently to the 
detriment of veterans. 
First, while the CAVC is technically an appellate court, its decisions are 
reviewed by a separate intermediate appellate court, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, before they are ripe for certiorari petition to the 
United States Supreme Court.18 This structure, which demands that veterans 
obtain at least two appellate court rulings before seeking review from the court of 
last resort, is not only unusual—it is frustrating insofar as it adds another time-
consuming layer to a claims decision process that is already laborious, riddled with 
error, and defined by delay. To make matters worse, veterans often have no right 
whatsoever to appeal certain CAVC decisions as a result of the Federal Circuit’s 
circumscribed appellate jurisdiction over VA claims, which is limited to reviewing 
legal issues.19 The Federal Circuit, for example, is expressly prohibited by statute 
from considering a veteran’s challenge “to [a VA] factual determination” or “to a 
[VA] law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular case.”20 
Second, the overwhelming majority of CAVC claims appeals are decided on 
the paper record, without oral argument, and by a single judge.21 Because single-
judge decisions are not precedential,22 they leave “veteran claimants and the 
agency . . . without binding guidance on how the law should be interpreted and 
applied in different factual contexts, which, in turn, generates additional appeals 
at both the agency and judicial levels.”23 Even more concerning is a recent 
empirical study which found that “the outcomes in [single-judge CAVC] cases 
depend heavily upon which judge decides the appeal.”24 Needless to say, a 
 
Robert L. Rabin, Preclusion of Judicial Review in the Processing of Claims for Veterans’ Benefits: A Preliminary 
Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 905, 905 (1975)). 
 17. Michael J. Wishnie, “A Boy Gets in Trouble”: Service Members, Civil Rights, and Veterans’ Law 
Exceptionalism, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1709, 1709–10, 1712 (2017). 
 18. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c) (2018). 
 19. Id. § 7292(c)–(d) 
 20. Id. § 7292(d)(2). 
 21. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, FISCAL YEAR 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 2, 
5 (2018) [hereinafter CAVA FY 2018 REPORT], 
https://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/FY2018AnnualReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/89AP-
DF6U]; see also James D. Ridgway et al., “Not Reasonably Debatable”: The Problems with Single-Judge 
Decisions by the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, 27 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 11 (2016) (explaining 
that “in recent years, single-judge dispositions have come to dominate to a degree far greater than 
non-precedential decisions used in the other federal courts of appeals”). 
 22. 38 U.S.C. § 7254(b). 
 23. Ridgway et al., supra note 21, at 3. 
 24. Id. 
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veteran’s right to service-connected benefits ought not hinge on the luck of that 
veteran’s judicial draw in any given CAVC appeal. 
Third, the CAVC is highly unlikely to resolve a veteran’s benefits claim appeal 
on the merits. The court has the statutory authority to affirm, modify, or reverse 
a VA claims determination, or to remand the case to VA for additional 
development.25 Yet, the CAVC very rarely flexes its authority to render a final 
decision.26 
In 2018, for example, the CAVC reversed and remanded non-extraordinary 
relief cases to VA in whole or in part approximately 80% of the time,27 which 
matches the rate at which the court reversed and remanded those same types of 
claims in 2008.28 Such astronomical remand rates are disturbing for at least two 
reasons. Most obviously, they indicate that VA reached an inadequate or 
erroneous result in approximately four out of five veterans claims it decided over 
the most recent ten-year period for which claims data are available. Equally 
concerning, the CAVC’s practice of remanding claims back to VA for do-overs—
instead of exercising its authority to modify or decide the appeal—exacerbates the 
unconscionably lengthy periods of time it takes the agency to favorably decide and 
implement veteran claim awards, which currently average 2,213 days, or more 
than six years.29 
The CAVC’s habit of reversing and remanding claims back to the VA in lieu 
of issuing final decisions “simply put[s] the aging veteran back on what has been 
called the ‘hamster wheel’ of [VA] claims recycling”30—a seemingly endless process 
that veterans characterize as “Delay, Deny, Wait Till They Die.”31 By all accounts, 
the VA claims process has earned this moniker. A recent VA Inspector General’s 
report acknowledged that 1,100 American veterans with unresolved service-
connected disability claims that had been pending before VA for more than a year 
died in 2016 alone.32 As Professor Wishnie wryly observed, “It is easy to justify 
judicial review of veterans benefits claims, but it is difficult to defend the current 
system.”33 
 
 25. 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a). 
 26. McClean, supra note 13, at 296 (noting that while the CAVC “has the power to modify or 
reverse Board decisions, . . . it has used that power sparingly”). 
 27. CAVA FY 2018 REPORT, supra note 21, at 3. 
 28. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, ANNUAL REPORTS (1999–2008), 
https://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/Annual_Report_-_20081.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XRH-
RNPQ]. 
 29. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 16-01750-79, VETERANS 
BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION: REVIEW OF TIMELINESS OF THE APPEALS PROCESS 4 (2018) 
[hereinafter VA IG TIMELINESS REPORT], https://www.va.gov/oig/pubs/VAOIG-16-01750-79.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UL7Z-JGQX]. 
 30. James T. O’Reilly, Burying Caesar: Replacement of the Veterans Appeals Process Is Needed to 
Provide Fairness to Claimants, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 223, 238 (2001). 
 31. McClean, supra note 13, at 277 (explaining that “‘Delay, Deny, Wait Till They Die’ . . . is a 
battle cry for soldiers, sailors, and airmen who have long put aside their armaments but remain 
entangled in the unending appeals process of the [VA] disability benefits system”). 
 32. VA IG TIMELINESS REPORT, supra note 29, at 12. 
 33. Wishnie, supra note 17, at 1733. 
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IV.  THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
The above-described, due-process-depriving aspects of the veterans claims 
judicial review regime are exacerbated by the federal law that denies veterans the 
fundamental right to counsel during the initial stage of the VA claims process. 
This Article contends that the law that denies our former service members the 
basic right to representation is the single biggest challenge veterans face in the VA 
system. Therefore, it advocates for either the repeal of the statute that limits a 
veteran’s right to representation or an overturning of the Supreme Court’s 1985 
decision in Walters v. National Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, which upheld the 
constitutionality of that law.34 In order for the reader to thoroughly appreciate 
the import of extending a right to counsel to veterans at the initial stage of the 
VA claims process, however, it is imperative to first describe the ever-evolving and 
increasingly complex VA service-connected disability claims process, detail the 
country’s long history of denying veterans access to counsel in that system, and 
explain and debunk the patronizing half-truths that VA continues to advance in 
defense of the status quo. 
A.  THE VA SERVICE-CONNECTED DISABILITY BENEFITS SYSTEM 
“Within the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA), disabled veterans are 
being retraumatized by an overburdened and dysfunctional benefits system 
that Congress intended to be ‘veteran-friendly,’ but in fact prevents veterans 
from obtaining the benefits they earned in service.”35 
State-sponsored legislative schemes designed to provide benefits to disabled 
service members date back to at least sixteenth-century Elizabethan England.36 
Such American veteran compensation systems, which trace their roots to the 
British regime, developed in response to colonial warmongering with indigenous 
North Americans and, therefore, predate the founding of the United States.37 
“The evolution of the American system of veteran disability compensation is 
closely tied to the evolution of American warfare and, as such, finds its ascendency 
in the very first war the country fought as a nation.”38 Indeed, the overwhelming 
 
 34. Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 334 (1985), superseded on other 
grounds by statute, Veterans’ Judicial Review Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C. (2018)). 
 35. McClean, supra note 13, at 280. 
 36. Geoffrey L. Hudson, Disabled Veterans and the State in Early Modern England, in DISABLED 
VETERANS IN HISTORY 117, 117 (David A. Gerber ed., 2012). 
 37. H. COMM. ON VETERANS’ AFFAIRS, 90TH CONG., MEDICAL CARE OF VETERANS 2 (Comm. 
Print 1967) (reporting that the 1593 English-disabled-veterans compensation scheme was “the 
cornerstone of the entire structure of the American compensation and pension system, and Federal 
care for disabled veterans, that came into being centuries later”); Jennifer D. Oliva, Son of Sam, Service-
Connected Entitlements, and Disabled Veteran Prisoners, 25 GEO. MASON L. REV. 302, 306–07 (2018) 
(explaining that “the very first such law was ‘enacted in 1636 by Plymouth [and] provided money to 
those disabled in the colony’s defense against [the Pequot] Indians’” (alterations in original) (quoting 
U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, VA HISTORY IN BRIEF 3, 
https://www.va.gov/opa/publications/archives/docs/history_in_brief.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LA4T-U4AH])). 
 38. Oliva, supra note 37, at 307. 
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majority of major developments in veterans law were enacted during or preceding 
significant American conflicts as a result of veteran dissatisfaction with the then-
in-place system. 
Congress established the Bureau of Pensions—the first federal department 
authorized to administer veteran disability benefits and a precursor to VA—in 
1833.39 The ensuing Civil War era marked the rise of powerful veterans’ service 
organizations, which successfully lobbied the federal government for enhanced 
veterans’ benefits.40 In 1862, for example, Congress enacted a statute that 
compensated veterans for service-connected disabilities and diseases, granted 
additional benefits for veterans’ dependents, and provided disability payments to 
veterans with non-wartime service.41 It was not until after the United States 
entered World War I and reinstated the draft, however, that Congress created a 
schedule to rate and compensate service-connected disabilities similar to the 
current system administered by VA.42 
Under the modern regime, veterans are entitled to service-connected disability 
compensation so long as they were discharged or released under conditions other 
than dishonorable43 and can establish that (1) they suffer a current disability; (2) 
they experienced an in-service event; and (3) the in-service event either caused or 
aggravated their current disability.44 In response to widespread criticism of VA’s 
then-existing claims adjudication process,45 Congress enacted the Veterans 
Appeals Improvement and Modernization Act of 2017 (AMA).46 The AMA 
established a new VA disability claims process, which is examined below. Before 
the AMA’s February 19, 2019 effective date, veterans were required to persist 
through the VA’s legacy claims adjudication process (the legacy system), which the 
agency itself has characterized as “complicated, opaque, [and] unpredictable.”47 
Under VA’s legacy benefits administration system, veterans were first required 
 
 39. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 37, at 4 (“When Congress authorized the 
establishment of the Bureau of Pensions in 1833, it was the first administrative unit dedicated solely 
to the assistance of veterans. The new Bureau of Pensions was administered from 1833 to 1840 as 
part of the Department of War, and from 1840 to 1849 as the Office of Pensions under the Navy 
Secretary. The office then was assigned to the new Department of the Interior, and renamed the 
Bureau of Pensions.”). 
 40. INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., A 21ST CENTURY SYSTEM FOR EVALUATING 
VETERANS FOR DISABILITY BENEFITS 96 (Michael McGeary et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter IOM 
REPORT]; Levy, supra note 10, at 310 (“The Civil War, which left many veterans severely wounded, 
marked a significant expansion of benefits, as the size of the veteran population and the problems 
they faced forced Congress to become more involved and to initiate new programs.”); McClean, supra 
note 13, at 285 (discussing the “high remand rates of the Board and the Veterans Court”). 
 41. Act of July 14, 1862, ch. 166, 12 Stat. 566; see IOM REPORT, supra note 40, at 95–96. 
 42. See Act of Oct. 6, 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-90, §§ 301–02, 40 Stat. 398, 405–06. 
 43. 38 U.S.C. § 101(2) (2018); 38 C.F.R. § 3.1(d) (2019). 
 44. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131. 
 45. Legislative Hearing on: H.R. 3216, H.R. 4150, H.R. 4764, H.R. 5047, H.R. 5083, H.R. 5162, 
H.R. 5166, H.R. 5392, H.R. 5407, H.R. 5416, H.R. 5420, H.R. 5428: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
Veterans’ Affairs, 114th Cong. 40 (2016) [hereinafter Legislative Hearing] (testimony of Sloan Gibson, 
Deputy Secretary for the Department of Veterans Affairs). 
 46. Veterans Appeals Improvement and Modernization Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-55, 131 
Stat. 1105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.). 
 47. Stacey-Rae Simcox, Thirty Years of Veterans Law: Welcome to the Wild West, 67 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 513, 548 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Legislative Hearing, supra note 45, 
at 18 (statement of Sloan Gibson, Deputy Secretary for the Department of Veterans Affairs)). 
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to file an initial claim with one of the VA’s fifty-six regional offices (VAROs).48 A 
VARO employee, who is not required to have any formal legal training, would 
then decide the veteran’s claim. A veteran dissatisfied with the VARO’s decision 
could appeal the claim by filing a Notice of Disagreement (NOD).49 The VARO, 
thereafter, was required to respond to the NOD with a Statement of the Case 
(SOC), which provided the veteran a more detailed explanation concerning the 
VARO’s claim decision.50 In 2016, it took the VAROs an average of 408 days to 
issue a SOC explaining its own previously issued claims decision.51 
The legacy system required veterans unsatisfied with their SOC to appeal their 
claim to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) by filing a VA Form 9.52 The 
Board—which is staffed exclusively with VA employees—was then responsible for 
issuing a claims decision.53 Although the Board is authorized to make a final 
determination on any veteran’s claim, it, instead, remands approximately three-
quarters of the appeals that it decides54 back to the VARO due to error during 
the initial claims decision proceedings.55 
A Board remand effectively amounts to a redo of the hamster wheel-like VA 
claims cycle, restarting it at the VARO-claims-decision stage of the process. As a 
recent GAO report reveals, “[V]eterans waited an average of 3 years from the date 
they initiated their appeal to resolution by either VBA or the Board—and a 
cumulative average of 7 years for appeals resolved by the Board” in fiscal year 
2017.56 Once the Board issues a final decision, the veteran can appeal the claim 
to the CAVC,57 which, as previously explained, remands approximately 80% of 
the non-emergency petition claims it reviews back to the Board for further 
proceedings.58 
The AMA’s purpose is to reduce the extravagant VA claims backlog and to 
expedite the claims decision process for veterans. To VA’s credit, the agency took 
the position during the AMA congressional hearings that its legacy claims 
adjudication process was broken and ought to be revamped. VA, in fact, conceded 
 
 48. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 5107(a), 5110(a); 38 C.F.R. § 19.24. 
 49. 38 U.S.C. § 7105(a)–(b)(1)(C). 
 50. 38 C.F.R. §§ 19.26(d), 19.29. 
 51. VA IG TIMELINESS REPORT, supra note 29, at 4. 
 52. 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Simcox, Thirty Years of Veterans Law, supra note 47, at 528 (“In 2017, the Board remanded 
or reversed 73% of the appeals of Regional Office decisions.”). 
 55. Catherine Trombley, The Appeals Process: When an Appeal Is Remanded, U.S. DEP’T OF 
VETERANS’ AFFAIRS: VANTAGE POINT (Feb. 24, 2016, 11:00 AM), 
https://www.blogs.va.gov/VAntage/26013/the-appeals-process-remands/ [https://perma.cc/3VL6-
ZYUG] (“In VA’s circular system, appeals are remanded for many reasons. A remand may be 
necessary if there has been a change in law, a worsening of a disability on appeal or the Veteran 
introduces new evidence or theory of entitlement at the Board.”). 
 56. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-352, VA DISABILITY BENEFITS: IMPROVED 
PLANNING PRACTICES WOULD BETTER ENSURE SUCCESSFUL APPEALS REFORM 1 (2018) (emphasis 
added). 
 57. 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a). 
 58. BD. OF VETERANS’ APPEALS, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS APPEALS, ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL 
YEAR 2018, at 14 fig., https://www.bva.va.gov/docs/Chairmans_Annual_Rpts/BVA2018AR.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5LXK-32H5] [hereinafter VA ANNUAL REPORT FY 2018]. 
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that the system had devolved into a “complicated, opaque, unpredictable and less 
veteran-friendly” process that “makes adversaries out of veterans and [the] VA” 
and “is ridiculously slow.”59 Veterans who filed their claims prior to the AMA’s 
February 19, 2019 effective date may remain in the legacy system or opt into the 
AMA process upon receipt of a SOC.60 
The AMA departs from the legacy system process upon the veteran’s receipt of 
the initial VARO claims decision and, thereafter, provides three different 
pathways to pursue an appeal. First, a veteran can seek a higher-level, de novo 
review of the claim at the VARO within one year of the initial decision on the 
record evidence.61 This pathway varies significantly from the legacy system, which 
permits veterans to submit new evidence during the pendency of any appeal. 
Second, the veteran can submit a NOD requesting Board review of the claim.62 
This pathway eliminates the legacy system’s threshold requirements that the 
VARO provides a SOC and the veteran completes a VA Form 9 in order to perfect 
a Board appeal. Finally, a veteran can submit a “supplemental claim” if the initial 
VARO decision is more than a year old or if the veteran has received a decision 
by the higher-level authority, the Board or the CAVC, within a year.63 This 
pathway requires a veteran to submit “new and relevant evidence,” and, if the 
veteran elects this option once a year has passed since the VA or CAVC has made 
the at-issue claims decision, the benefits effective date (the date a veteran is 
deemed eligible for compensation) shifts from the earlier date of filing the initial 
claim to the later date of filing the supplemental claim to the veteran’s 
detriment.64 
Once a veteran’s appeal is perfected before the Board, the AMA, again, 
provides veterans with a trifecta of distinct options. Veterans who elect the first 
pathway are entitled to a hearing before the Board with the concomitant right to 
submit additional evidence for the Board’s consideration.65 Veterans who choose 
the second pathway are permitted to submit additional evidence to the Board but 
must forfeit any hearing.66 Finally, veterans may opt to permit the Board to decide 
their appeal on the record but, in so doing, forfeit their hearing and the 
submission of any additional evidence for the Board’s review.67 
B.  VETERAN RIGHT-TO-COUNSEL LIMITATIONS: HISTORY AND BASES 
“[N]onadversarial procedures depart dramatically from our usual conception 
 
 59. Legislative Hearing, supra note 45, at 18 (statement of Sloan Gibson, Deputy Secretary for the 
Department of Veterans Affairs). 
 60. Veterans Appeals Improvement and Modernization Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-55, § 
2(x)(5), 131 Stat. 1105, 1115 (codified as 38 U.S.C. § 101 note (Effective and Applicability 
Provisions)). 
 61. 8 U.S.C. § 5104B(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), (d)–(e). 
 62. Id. §§ 5104C(a)(1)(C), 7105(b)(1)(A). 
 63. Id. § 5104C(a)(1)(B), (b). 
 64. Id. §§ 5108(a), 5110(a)(3). 
 65. Id. §§ 7105(b)(3)(A), 7113(b)(1)–(2). 
 66. Id. §§ 7105(b)(3)(B), 7113(c)(1)–(2); see VA ANNUAL REPORT FY 2018, supra note 58, at 15 
fig. (depicting the VA claims adjudication process under the AMA). 
 67. 8 U.S.C. §§ 7105(b)(3)(C), 7113(a). 
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of due process and their fairness rests on the assumption that the system 
truly operates in a pro-veteran manner.”68 
Statutory provisions proscribing a veteran’s right to counsel in veteran benefit 
proceedings date back to the Civil War. In 1862, Congress enacted a law limiting 
the fee that an attorney was permitted to charge a veteran for benefits-related 
services to five dollars.69 Two years later, on July 4, 1864, Congress increased that 
cap to ten dollars,70 where it remained unchanged for 124 years until the passage 
of the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act in 1988.71 
As Army veteran and law professor Stacey-Rae Simcox has explained, the 
primary impetus for the Civil War-era attorney fee limitation was congressional 
concern about unscrupulous lawyers bilking unsuspecting veterans out of their 
hard-earned entitlements.72 Professor Simcox points to remarks provided by 
Senator Edward Bragg of Wisconsin during an 1886 congressional debate about 
veteran-widow pension legislation as axiomatic of “Congress[’s] . . . disdain for 
attorneys in the 1860s to 1890s.”73 She makes a powerful point. During that 
debate, Senator Bragg characterized attorneys’ fees as “blood taken from the 
soldiers whom they pretend to love.”74 He went on to say: “[T]hese (attorneys) that 
present to be ‘friends of soldiers’ are the friends of soldiers as vultures are the 
friends of dead bodies—because they feed and fatten them. . . . They have the voice 
of Jacob, but their hand has the clutch of Esau.”75 
In 1983, a group of veterans, veterans’ organizations, and a veteran’s widow 
filed suit in federal district court challenging the constitutionality of the $10 
attorney fee limitation in National Ass’n of Radiation Survivors v. Walters.76 The 
Walters plaintiffs contended that the fee cap effectively precluded them from 
hiring qualified attorneys to advocate their VA service-connected disability and 
death claims related to their in-service exposure to radiation and Agent Orange in 
violation of their Fifth Amendment right to procedural due process and First 
Amendment rights to free association and redress of grievances.77 
The district court analyzed the veterans’ Fifth Amendment procedural due 
process claim under the three-pronged Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, which 
requires the weighing of the following factors: (1) “the private interest that will be 
affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of any 
additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s 
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative 
 
 68. Levy, supra note 10, at 315–16. 
 69. Act of July 14, 1862, ch. 166, § 6, 12 Stat. 566, 568. 
 70. Act of July 4, 1864, ch. 247, § 12, 13 Stat. 387, 389. 
 71. See Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 104, 102 Stat. 4105, 4108 (1988) 
(codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)–(d)). 
 72. Simcox, Thirty Years After Walters, supra note 15, at 681–85. 
 73. Id. at 682. 
 74. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting WILLIAM H. GLASSON, FEDERAL MILITARY 
PENSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 214 (David Kinley ed., 1918)). 
 75. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting GLASSON, supra note 74, at 214). 
 76. 589 F. Supp. 1302, 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1984), rev’d, 473 U.S. 305 (1985). 
 77. Id. at 1306, 1310. 
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burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”78 
With regard to the first Mathews prong, the district court determined that “[t]he 
veterans’ interest in obtaining service-connected death and disability benefits is 
extremely high.”79 It based that ruling in part on the fact that “the VA claims 
procedure is the veterans’ sole remedy against the government [because] [t]hey 
cannot sue for disabilities stemming from their military service under the Federal 
Torts Claims Act” as a result of the Feres doctrine.80 
The district court next held that the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the 
veterans’ significant interest in obtaining VA disability and death benefits was 
substantial without adequate attorney representation. In reaching that result, the 
court made at least two findings supported by the record that are worth 
highlighting. First, it explained that “[t]he undisputed factual evidence submitted 
by the plaintiffs in th[e] case show[ed] that both the procedures and the substance 
entailed in presenting [service-connected death and disability] claims to the VA 
[we]re extremely complex.”81 
Procedurally claimants are faced with an interplay between the following: 
statutes; regulations published in the Code of Federal Regulations; the 
Procedural Manual M-21-1; the BVA Manual; the Program Guide; the Filed 
Appellate Procedures Manual M1-1; adjudication memoranda; VA circulars; 
informal memoranda; and BVA decisions. The interrelationship between 
these various rules is so complex that one VA adjudication officer . . . 
developed his own personal cross-index on file cards in an attempt to master 
the complexity. . . . 
 Veterans’ failure to comply with the VA’s procedural regulations may 
result in denial of their claims. . . . 
 Claims for service-connected death and disability benefits often turn on 
very complicated substantive analyses as well. The determination of the 
degree of disability frequently rests on a difficult medical analysis, and proof 
of service connection may raise causation issues which require both 
medically and legally complex analyses. . . . 
 Often, to make a convincing claim, veterans or their families have to 
gather and present vast amounts of factual information regarding both the 
medical nature of the veteran’s illness and also the circumstances which 
might have given rise to that illness. . . . Adequate preparation of such claims 
may often require hundreds of hours of work, and will in many cases 
necessitate obtaining expert testimony.82 
The court also flatly rejected the VA’s age-old, go-to argument in support of its 
consistent opposition to the extension of basic legal rights to former service 
members: that is, that permitting veterans to hire counsel would undermine the 
 
 78. Id. at 1314 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 1319. 
 82. Id. at 1319–20 (citations omitted). 
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agency’s pro-claimant, informal, and non-adversarial benefits adjudication system. 
The record before the court sorely undermined that contention, demonstrating 
not only that VA frequently failed to assist veterans but often actively encouraged 
them to abandon important procedural rights.83 “[G]iven . . . VA’s apparent 
inability to protect a claimant’s interests as fully as might that claimant’s personal 
paid attorney, both claimants and attorneys familiar with the VA system view that 
system as adversarial, despite the contrary description [provided by VA 
regulations].”84 
The district court then took up its analysis of the third Mathews factor: the 
government’s interest in maintaining the $10 attorney fee cap. The court held 
that VA had “failed to demonstrate that it would suffer any harm if the statutory 
fee limitation, in existence in some form since 1862, were lifted.”85 The court 
went on to note that the only harm that VA even proffered that it would suffer 
should the fee limitation be eliminated was its self-appointed position as “the 
paternalistic protector of claimants’ supposed best interests.”86 Consequently, the 
district court issued a nationwide injunction on the attorney fee limitation, which 
the purportedly pro-veteran VA promptly appealed to the United States Supreme 
Court. 
VA made several now-familiar arguments in its campaign to convince the high 
court to keep $10 attorney fee cap in place. First, the agency contended that “the 
presence of retained counsel is not necessary to a fair procedure” because of VA’s 
“informal and non[-]adversarial claims system for processing veterans’ benefits, in 
which the VA is responsible for assisting veterans to establish their claims.”87 
Second, VA insisted permitting veterans to hire counsel was unnecessary because 
veterans had the right to seek the assistance of non-law-trained veteran service 
organization (VSO) personnel “to provide . . . representation to veterans without 
charge.”88 Finally, the agency maintained—without citation to any support—that 
“the fee limit ensures that veterans’ benefits are not depleted through payments 
to counsel and that veterans are protected from overreaching and unscrupulous 
attorneys.”89 
Appellant American G.I. Forum, the nation’s “largest Hispanic veteran’s 
organization,” responded to VA by asserting that 
The government’s euphoric and sanitized description of the [agency’s] 
alleged “non-adversarial” system is in conflict with the record below and is 
an elaborate legal camouflage of a reality that no court, particularly this 
court, can or should ignore. 
 
 83. See id. at 1320–21. 
 84. Id. at 1321 (citation omitted). 
 85. Id. at 1323 (footnote omitted). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Brief for Appellants at 15, Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 
(1985) (No. 84-571), 1985 WL 669992, at *15. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
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 . . . .  
 . . . None of the more than six thousand Agent Orange cases and only 
one percent (15 of 2,000) of atomic radiation cases [submitted to VA] have 
been adjudicated in favor of the [veteran].90 
Numerous organizations intervened on appeal as amici curiae in support of the 
veteran appellees, including the Federal Bar Association, which contended: 
No legitimate Governmental interest compels shutting the VA door to 
retained counsel. Appellants’ suggestion that, because these benefits are 
assertedly “gratuities,” the Constitution should tolerate an “experiment” 
that fails to comport with due process, or other Constitutional norms, is an 
argument long ago rejected by this Court. The paternalistic notion that 
proceeding without legal advice is really in the veteran’s best interest is 
punctured when the system as it actually operates is examined and the 
“claimed benefits [are] candidly appraised.” The Government’s other 
asserted interests—that there is some worth in keeping the proceedings 
informal and that veterans and their survivors must be protected from 
unscrupulous lawyers—simply do not warrant the draconian measure of 
restricting access to retained counsel. If informality is desirable, it need not 
be incompatible with legal representation.91 
Federal Bar counsel went on to emphasize what the extensive district court 
record and VA regulations proved: “[T]hat the VA’s supposed paternalism does 
not inure to the veterans’ best interests” and “in view of the mandate that VA 
employees may assist veterans to develop their claims ‘while protecting the interests 
of the Government,’ the VA personnel possess a divided loyalty assuring that the 
VA cannot fully serve the best interests of the applicants.”92 The National 
Association of Atomic Veterans pressed a similar argument, asserting that VA’s 
attempt to maintain the attorney fee limitation 
[S]imply by dubbing [its] process “informal” and “nonadversarial” not only 
distorts the facts, but fundamentally misconceives the nature of the problem. 
Regardless of the degree of formality of V.A. hearings, the burden of proof 
is on the applicant, and if he fails to develop and present available evidence 
due to ignorance or incapacity, the proof fails, even in the absence of an 
“adversary.”93 
These contentions, however, fell on deaf ears. Notwithstanding the record 
evidence, the Supreme Court adopted VA’s arguments in toto and held, in a 6–3 
decision, that the attorney fee limitation comported with a veteran’s Fifth 
 
 90. Brief for Intervenor-Appellee American G.I. Forum at 1, 6–8, Walters, 473 U.S. 305 (No. 
84-571), 1985 WL 669996, at *1, *6–8 (citations omitted). 
 91. Brief for the Federal Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae at 6–7, Walters, 473 U.S. 305 (No. 84-571), 
1985 WL 670015, at *6–7 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
 92. Id. at 21 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 93. Brief for the National Ass’n of Atomic Veterans as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees 
at 15–16, Walters, 473 U.S. 305 (No. 84-571), 1985 WL 670021, at *15–16 (citations omitted). 
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Amendment right to due process.94 In so doing, the Court pointed to several 
aspects of the VA disability claims process that it characterized as inherently pro-
veteran and non-adversarial, such as the ex parte nature of the proceedings before 
the Board, which do not include a government lawyer; VA’s obligation to both 
“assist [a veteran] in developing the facts pertinent to his claim” and give the 
veteran the benefit of the doubt—that is, grant a veteran’s claim when the evidence 
is in equipoise; and lack of imposition of any statute of limitations or res judicata 
effect on veterans’ claims.95 
Writing for the majority, then-Justice Rehnquist relied heavily on statistics that 
showed that (1) only “a tiny fraction” of veterans claims are properly characterized 
as “‘complex’ cases,” and (2) veterans represented by pro bono counsel before the 
Board were only marginally more successful than those represented by non-law-
trained VSOs on appeal.96 Justice Rehnquist further asserted that the Court owed 
deference to the legislative concern about attorney fee-splitting even though he 
acknowledged Congress’s on-the-record concession that “the original stated 
interest in protecting veterans from unscrupulous lawyers was ‘no longer 
tenable.’”97 The Walters majority concluded by adopting VA’s argument that the 
introduction of lawyers to its claims adjudication system would make VA’s 
informal, pro-claimant process more adversarial: “[E]ven apart from the 
frustration of Congress’ principal goal of wanting the veteran to get the entirety 
of the award, the destruction of the fee limitation would bid fair to complicate a 
proceeding which Congress wished to keep as simple as possible.”98 In a blistering 
dissent, Justice Stevens wrote that, 
[R]egardless of the nature of the dispute between the sovereign and the 
citizen—whether it be a criminal trial, a proceeding to terminate parental 
rights, a claim for social security benefits, a dispute over welfare benefits, or 
a pension claim asserted by the widow of a soldier who was killed on the 
battlefield—the citizen’s right to consult an independent lawyer and to retain 
that lawyer to speak on his or her behalf is an aspect of liberty that is 
priceless.99 
Three years after the Supreme Court decided Walters, Congress repealed the 
$10 attorney fee limitation and replaced it with a statute that permitted veterans 
to hire attorneys for a reasonable fee—but not until the Board had reached a final 
decision on the veteran’s claim and the evidentiary record was closed.100 Congress 
has since adjusted the rule that controls a veteran’s right to hire an attorney during 
the VA claims adjudication process on several occasions. Under current law, 
veterans are entitled to pro bono attorney assistance at all stages of the VA claims 
process. Veterans remain prohibited, however, from hiring counsel to represent 
 
 94. Walters, 473 U.S. at 334. 
 95. Id. at 310 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(a) (1984)). 
 96. Id. at 330–31. 
 97. Id. at 322 (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-466, at 50 (1982)). 
 98. Id. at 326. 
 99. Id. at 371 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 100. Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 104, 102 Stat. 4105, 4108 (1988) 
(codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)–(d) (2018)). 
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them in VA proceedings until after a VARO has reached a decision on their claim 
and the veteran files an NOD.101 In other words, veterans remain barred by statute 
from hiring an attorney to assist them during the initial claims stage in the VA 
benefits system. 
V.  RECOMMENDED REFORM: A VETERAN RIGHT-TO-COUNSEL AT 
ALL STAGES OF THE VA CLAIMS ADJUDICATION PROCESS 
“The absence of legal representation does not benefit veterans.”102 
This Article advocates for the extension of the fundamental right to counsel to 
veterans at all stages of the VA claims process. This reform can be accomplished 
in one of two ways: either the Supreme Court can overturn Walters, or Congress 
can repeal the statute that prohibits veterans from hiring an attorney until the 
appellate stage of the VA claims adjudication process. This proposal is supported 
by both an army of good reasons and numerous legal experts, many of whom are 
themselves either veterans or veterans’ advocates.103 
First, Walters was difficult to defend at the time it was decided. As explained 
above, the Supreme Court was persuaded that permitting veterans to hire 
attorneys in agency proceedings would disrupt the purportedly non-adversarial, 
pro-claimant VA claims process. The Court reached that conclusion, however, by 
largely ignoring the record evidence, which was unrefuted by VA and established 
that (1) the VA adjudication system was so procedurally and substantively complex 
that even seasoned attorneys deemed the scheme extraordinarily complicated to 
navigate; (2) VSOs lacked the expertise and resources to provide adequate 
representation to veterans in those complex proceedings; (3) VA not only 
frequently neglected to satisfy its duty to assist veterans with their claims, it 
encouraged veterans to waive important rights throughout the proceedings; and 
(4) VA’s contention that its claims adjudication was non-adversarial was suspect 
because VA regulations expressly stated that VA employees were obligated to 
protect the interests of the government. Moreover, and even assuming arguendo 
that Walters properly characterized the VA claims process as pro-veteran and non-
adversarial, VA failed to advance any reasonable rationale as to why such a veteran-
friendly system would be hampered—instead of helped—by permitting veterans to 
hire counsel to ensure that VA fulfills its duties to veterans when evaluating and 
adjudicating their service-related entitlement claims. 
Second, while Walters was most likely wrongly decided in 1985, the decision is 
impossible to avow today. It is uncontroversial that the VA claims adjudication 
process has become increasingly adversarial and complex since the mid-1980s. Just 
three years after Walters was issued, in fact, Congress enacted the VJRA, which 
both mandated judicial oversight of VA claims decisions for the first time in 
American history and repealed the $10 attorney fee limitation in favor of a rule 
 
 101. See 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1). 
 102. Wishnie, supra note 17, at 1721. 
 103. See, e.g., McClean, supra note 13, at 307–16; Simcox, Thirty Years After Walters, supra note 
15, at 731–35; Wishnie, supra note 17, at 1730–41. 
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that permitted veterans to hire an attorney after the Board issued its initial 
decision. The VJRA, therefore, “struck at the core of the non-adversarial 
system.”104 
Several of the qualities of the VA system on which the Walters Court relied in 
concluding that the claims adjudication process is “pro-veteran” and “non-
adversarial” have been proven either nonexistent or illusory since 1985. For 
example, while there was scant record evidence to support the Supreme Court’s 
determination that the VA claims process was “simple” to navigate thirty-five years 
ago, there is no proof whatsoever that such is the case today.105 “VA benefits 
involve a lengthy and confusing statutory scheme, implemented through 
hundreds of pages of regulations and sub-regulatory agency guidelines, and often 
turning on assessment of conflicting medical information.”106 Myriad experts have 
opined on the ever-increasing complexity of the VA benefits process, and some 
have even attributed the VA’s extravagant decisional error rates at both the VARO 
and the Board stages of the process to system complexity.107 Perhaps most telling, 
even the CAVC has described VA regulations as “a confusing tapestry for the 
adjudication of claims.”108 
Walters also pointed to the agency’s “veteran-friendly canons,” which impose 
on VA the duties to assist veterans to develop their claims109 and to extend to 
them the benefit of the doubt in the adjudication process110 as evidence that the 
VA system is non-adversarial. The duty to assist requires VA to help veterans 
obtain their military and medical records111 as well as provide veterans a medical 
assessment pertinent to their claim, which VA calls a “compensation and 
pension” (C&P) examination.112 VA, however, has long been criticized for failing 
to fulfill its duty to assist veterans.113 
As Air Force veteran and law professor Hugh McClean has expounded, 
“Violations of the duty to assist are common . . . and are often the basis for 
remands from the Board and [CAVC].”114 VA’s track record on “assisting” 
veterans to obtain their service and medical records is so poor that the leading 
treatise on veterans law flatly states that “[a]dvocates simply cannot rely upon the 
 
 104. McClean, supra note 13, at 288; see also id. at 307 (explaining that “[s]ince the 
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to say that “[t]here is an unfortunate—and not entirely unfounded—belief that veterans law is 
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VA to assist in gathering the necessary evidence on a claim.”115 Moreover, VARO 
adjudicators concede that VA C&P examinations are subpar, and 56% of these 
adjudicators in a recent poll contended that inadequate medical exams made it 
challenging to decide veterans claims.116 VA also has acknowledged that “[t]he 
[in]adequacy of medical examinations and opinions, such as those with 
incomplete findings or supporting rationale for an opinion, has remained one of 
the most frequent reasons for remand” because they constitute a violation of the 
duty to assist.117 VA has been similarly—and frequently—criticized for failing to 
follow the veteran-benefit-of-the-doubt canon faithfully.118 
Worse yet, VA recently—and successfully—lobbied Congress to enact 
limitations on its duty to assist veterans. Under the VA’s legacy claims system, VA 
was obligated to assist a veteran throughout its administrative adjudicative 
proceedings—from the initial claims stage until the Board made a final 
determination on the veteran’s claim. Under the recently effective AMA, 
however, the VA’s duty to assist terminates upon the veteran’s receipt of the initial 
VARO claim decision.119 This watered-down version of a long-standing, “veterans-
friendly” canon of VA law marks a clear move toward a more adversarial process 
and directly implicates the validity of Walters. As Professor Simcox has explained, 
“One of the apprehensions with this [restriction] on the duty to assist is that due 
to the limitation on when veterans may hire legal counsel, most veterans will not 
have the benefit of [hiring] an attorney before choosing [one of the three AMA 
pathways] of appeal.”120 
VA, in fact, has demonstrated a troubling pattern of backpedaling on its duty 
to assist in additional ways in order to ease its claims-administration burden since 
the Court decided Walters. In 2014, for example, VA implemented a new rule 
that formalized the claims process by requiring veterans to execute particular 
forms in order to initiate a claim and thereby preserve their “effective date”—the 
date on which they are entitled to VA compensation benefits.121 Under the pre-
2014 rules and in keeping with the alleged non-adversarial, “veteran-friendly” 
nature of the VA claims process, veterans were permitted to commence their 
claims and informally preserve the claims’ effective dates by sending something as 
simple as a handwritten note to VA.122 “The advent of newly required forms to 
file . . . claims that eat away at advantages to the veteran and attempt to shift 
burdens to the veteran ‘to speed things up’ are examples of the needle moving 
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towards a less veteran-friendly environment than was envisioned by the [Walters] 
Court.”123 
Third, the egregious and ever-increasing length of time it takes VA to make a 
final determination on veterans’ claims as a result of the agency’s exasperatingly 
high decisional error rate is reason—standing alone—to permit veterans to hire 
counsel at the inception of the claims process. In 2017, the CAVC remanded 
86% of the appeals it decided on the merits back to VA as a result of Board 
error.124 During the same time period, the Board remanded 73% of appeals it 
decided to a VARO due to agency error in the initial claims process.125 
This system—riddled with decisional error and dominated by a seemingly 
endless cycle of remands—requires veterans to wait seven years on average in order 
to receive a final benefits decision from VA.126 Disturbingly, thousands of our 
most vulnerable veterans die every year while waiting for a VA claims decision. As 
VA’s own adjudication-related statistics prove, “In terms of making timely and 
accurate compensation determinations, the VA sets low standards, and 
consistently fails to meet them.”127 The seven-year delay between the date a veteran 
files an initial claim and the date that veteran receives a final VA claims decision 
constitutes an unconscionable deprivation of due process and, without regard to 
any of the other issues raised in this Article, demands that veterans be permitted 
to hire an attorney to advocate on their behalf throughout the egregiously 
inadequate VA claims adjudication system. 
Finally, and for any remaining skeptics, there is good support for the argument 
that the injection of attorneys at the initial stage of VA proceedings could help 
reduce costs. First, attorneys could help filter frivolous claims out of the system by 
fulfilling their ethical duties under the rules of professional responsibility.128 
Second, VA-derived empirical evidence supports the argument that permitting 
veterans to hire attorneys at the initial stage of VA claims proceedings would 
reduce the extravagant costs associated with the VA’s high rate of claim 
determination errors.129 As Army veteran and attorney Benjamin Wright has 
argued: 
The rationale for proscribing attorney involvement was that if veterans had 
attorneys then so would the VA, and costs and time would increase. 
However, an equally strong argument can be made that lawyers would draft 
clear, complete, accurate claims with the legal framework in mind, and 
would thus assist VARO officials in reaching the correct disability 
compensation determination the first time. In doing so, attorneys would 
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help reduce the overall cost of the process and the amount of time it takes 
to adjudicate a claim.130 
Relying on the Board’s fiscal year 2008 statistics, Mr. Wright determined that 
“attorneys achieve a positive outcome for their . . . veteran clients more than any 
other form of representation” because veterans represented by attorneys were 
5.6% more likely to succeed on their claims than veterans represented by VSOs.131 
The Board’s fiscal year 2018 statistics are even more compelling: veterans 
represented by attorneys were nearly 9% more likely to succeed on their claims 
than their counterparts represented by VSOs.132 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Fundamental legal rights enjoyed by virtually all Americans—including the right 
to vindicate the federal government’s tortious conduct, the right to robust judicial 
review, and the right to hire counsel at all stages of legal proceedings—are directly 
attributable to the immense sacrifices that our veterans have made on behalf of 
the nation. There is, therefore, no justification for the federal government’s 
ongoing refusal to extend those basic rights to veterans. Instead of participating 
in culturally popular, cosmetic gestures—such as saluting veterans at local sporting 
events or thanking them for their service—this Article implores all Americans who 
truly appreciate veteran service and sacrifice to lobby their congressional 
delegations to repeal the law that denies veterans the right to hire counsel at all 
stages of the increasingly complex and adversarial VA claims adjudication 
proceedings and, thereby, deprives veterans of their best chance to realize their 
hard-earned, service-connected entitlements. 
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